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The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a valuable paradigm to study fairness considerations. Here,
we tested developmental differences between altruistic and strategic motivations in fair-
ness considerations using a version of the UG with hidden conditions. Participants were
proposers and could divide coins between themselves and an anonymous other. Hidden
information conditions involved division of coins where some coins were only visible to the
participant (e.g., 8/2 condition where, from the total of 10 coins, 8 coins were visible to both
players and 2 coins only visible to the proposer). In total, 22 young adults and 79 children
between ages 8 and 13 played multiple one-shot versions of the UG with hidden conditions
with anonymous others. Overall analyses confirmed validity of the task and showed that
participants of all age groups had strategic intentions. Specific task analyses revealed that
adults divided the coins equally in the standard UG conditions, but gave less to the second
player in the hidden information conditions. The developmental comparisons revealed an
age × condition interaction, such that adults and 10- to 12-year-old children differentiated
between standard and hidden conditions more than 8- to 9-year-old children.These findings
indicate that young children have a basic understanding of different strategic motives, but
that behavior of adults and older children is driven more by strategic intentions.
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INTRODUCTION
Making fairness related decisions is a common and important
component of social interactions. These decisions are based on
different underlying motives, including the relevance of true fair-
ness and the need to comply with generally applicable social norms
(Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Experimental tasks based on economic
exchanges have proven successful in examining people’s strate-
gies in bargaining situations and the factors that influence their
decision-making. One of these tasks is the well-known Ultima-
tum Game (UG). In this two-player bargaining game, the first
player (i.e., the proposer) makes an offer to divide the stake, for
example 10 coins, between the two players. The second player (i.e.,
the responder) decides either to accept or reject the proposed divi-
sion. If the offer is accepted, the coins are divided according to the
offer of the proposer. In case the responder rejects the proposed
offer, both parties receive nothing (Güth et al., 1982).
Many studies have examined what motivates proposers to offer
an equal distribution instead of a “game theoretic” smallest possi-
ble offer in the UG context (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Contrary to
what might be expected, people are not always primarily motivated
to maximize their own outcome and seem to care for equality.
A commonly given explanation is that proposers are motivated
by considerations of fairness (Binmore et al., 1991; Pillutla et al.,
1996; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Reuben and van Winden, 2008,
2010), which might be partially caused by the acquired social
norms of our society (Sally and Hill, 2006; Tomasello and Vaish,
in press).
However, besides the “altruistic” willingness to be fair (Kagel
et al., 1995; van Dijk and Vermunt, 2000; Kohler, 2011), players
might also be motivated by the fear of rejection (van Dijk et al.,
2004), resulting in strategic action (Güth et al., 1982; Binmore
et al., 1985). That is, if the offer is beneficial for the proposer but
not for the responder (i.e., an unfair split), the responder may
reject the offer. In this case, the responder prefers that both parties
receive nothing over an unfair split. Thus, the proposer in the UG
may wish to maximize self-profit, but may take the perspective of
the responder who might reject an unfair offer, resulting in the
socially desirable fair offer. In this case, fairness requires the abil-
ity to take the perspective of others into account (Gürogˇlu et al.,
2009; Steinbeis et al., 2012). In short, fairness considerations might
be based on two different processes: a true belief in fairness (i.e.,
an altruistic motivation), and a fear for rejection (i.e., a strategic
motivation).
DEVELOPMENTAL COMPARISONS
Several studies have shown that children under the age of 7 prefer
distributions in their own favor and that preference for fair distri-
butions increases with age (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008;
Gummerum et al., 2008; Blake and Rand, 2010; Blake and McAuli-
ffe, 2011). These developmental differences between ages 3–4 and
8 years have been interpreted as an increased preference for equity
(Fehr et al., 2008; Tomasello and Vaish, in press). For example,
Blake and McAuliffe (2011) examined inequity aversion among
4- to 8-year-olds, where participants could use an apparatus that
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divided candy by pulling a green or a red handle, which allowed
them to either accept or reject the offer. The game consisted of
two conditions: disadvantageous inequity (1/4) and advantageous
inequity (4/1). In both conditions the alternative distribution was
the equity distribution (1/1), controlling for a default rejection
tendency. Interestingly, only the 8-year-olds showed a preference
for fairness in both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity
conditions, willing to sacrifice their own coins in order to provide
equity in the advantageous inequity condition.
This developing preference for fairness over self-interest across
childhood is thought to partly depend on the acquisition of
perspective taking (PT) abilities, which enables children to take
another person’s view (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Takagishi et al.,
2010). This progressing ability to take the perspective of others,
which is defined here as the ability to understand thoughts and
intentions by others and willingness to act on this understanding,
can subsequently result in the development of strategic behavior.
One way of examining strategic intentions behind fairness con-
siderations is comparing offers made by proposers in the UG and
the Dictator Game (DG). The DG differs from the UG in the way
that proposals in the DG cannot be rejected by the receiver; the
proposed offer determines the outcome for both players. If fair-
ness is the driving force behind offering equal distributions, the
proposals should be the same in both experimental games. Indeed,
prior studies have demonstrated that fair proposals increase with
age in the UG relative to the DG, with the greatest change occur-
ring between ages 7 and 10 years (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Leman
et al., 2008; see also Steinbeis et al., 2012, who replicated the same
finding in children between ages 6 and 13 years).
Gürogˇlu et al. (2009) studied proposer behavior in 9–18 year
olds using an adapted version of the DG and the UG, which was
developed to study the role of PT. This experimental variant, also
referred to as the mini-UG, gave proposers two options for distrib-
uting 10 coins. One offer was always an unfair distribution (8 coins
for proposer, 2 for responder), and this offer was presented next to
another distribution which could be: 2 coins for the proposer and
8 for the responder (hyper-fair condition), 5 coins for both (fair
condition), or 10 coins for the proposer and none for the responder
(hyper-unfair condition). The findings showed that with increas-
ing age, participants were increasingly strategic in the offers they
made, such that they differentiated more between the three con-
ditions based on the alternative distribution that was presented.
Taken together, prior developmental studies show evidence for
an increase in offers in the UG between ages 7–8 and 12–13 years,
suggesting a developmental change in fairness considerations in
this period. The comparison between UG and DG behavior sug-
gests that even young children are able to act strategically (Har-
baugh et al., 2003), but that these strategic intentions increase with
age (Steinbeis et al., 2012). This leads to the question whether the
developmental changes in UG offers can indeed be attributed to
strategic (i.e., higher offers out of fear for rejection) rather than
altruistic (i.e., higher offers because of equity/fairness preference)
motivations behind fairness considerations.
DISSOCIATING ALTRUISTIC VERSUS STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Several researchers have employed a modified version of the UG
with hidden information conditions in order to dissociate between
altruistic and strategic considerations in UG offers (Kagel et al.,
1995; van Dijk et al., 2004; van Beest et al., 2011). Hidden infor-
mation refers to information that is only available to the proposer
and that can be used in his/her own benefit. For example, it can be
the case that the proposer has 10 coins to share with the responder,
but the responder thinks that there are only 8 coins in the game
(i.e., 8/2 condition where from the total of 10 coins, 8 coins were
visible to both players and 2 coins only visible to the proposer). If
the proposer’s decision was based on altruistic motivations, he or
she would offer 5 coins (a true fair split). However, if the proposer
is motivated by strategic considerations, he or she would offer 4
coins to the responder, knowing that the responder will think this
is a fair split. These hidden information conditions give the pro-
poser the opportunity to act in an altruistically fair manner or in
a seemingly fair manner, by making a strategic offer and using the
hidden information to maximize self-gain (Kagel et al., 1995; van
Dijk et al., 2004; Koning et al., 2011).
Prior studies demonstrate the influence of various sorts of hid-
den information on proposer behavior in adults. Overall, it was
found that proposers make more equal offers in complete infor-
mation conditions than in the hidden information conditions
and take advantage of hidden information by making seemingly
fair offers and maximizing self-gain (Camerer and Loewenstein,
1993; Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996;
Murnighan and Saxon, 1998; van Beest et al., 2011). The UG with
hidden information therefore proves valuable to answer questions
related to the development of fairness considerations based on
altruistic versus strategic motivations.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In the present study, we asked children between ages 8–13 and
adults to play the role of the proposer in the hidden information
version of the UG. Our main expectation was to find an increase in
strategic fairness with age. Specifically, we expected adults to make
higher offers than children in the complete information trials com-
pared to the hidden information trials, based on the assumption
that adults are better able to take the perspective of others and
make strategic offers based on what they are willing to receive
themselves (Page and Nowak, 2002). This pattern of behavior was
expected to emerge between ages 8 and 13 (Harbaugh et al., 2003;
Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Steinbeis et al., 2012). We also aimed
to investigate the role of PT skills in fairness considerations across
adolescence using a self-report index of PT abilities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In total there were 101 participants, including 22 adults between
ages 18 and 25 years (mean age= 20.23, SD= 1.23, 5 males and 17
females) and 79 children between ages 8 and 13 years. The chil-
dren were divided into four age groups: 8- to 9-year-olds (mean
age= 8.5 years, SD= 0.27, 4 boys and 10 girls), 10-year-olds (mean
age= 10, SD= 0.71, 7 boys and 11 girls), 11-year-olds (mean
age= 11.41 SD= 0.28, 14 boys and 13 girls), and 12-year-olds
and older (mean age= 12.37, SD= 0.32, 13 boys and 7 girls; see
Table 1). Of this sample, eight participants were excluded because
of missing data and eight because they were extreme outliers (e.g.,
only pressing button “1” for the whole task). All children were
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Table 1 | Descriptives of sample sizes, gender distribution, and mean
age in years (SD) of the five age groups.
Group
1 2 3 4 5
Number of participants 14 18 27 20 22
Female 71% 61% 48% 35% 77%
Mean age 8.5 10 11.41 12.32 20.23
SD 0.27 0.71 0.28 0.32 1.23
recruited from elementary schools and participated voluntarily
with the consent of the school and their parents. Adults were con-
tacted through a university recruitment program and were tested
in a quiet laboratory, comparable to the test session of the children.
THE HIDDEN ULTIMATUM GAME
The computer task was a variant of the classical UG. Written
instructions were presented on the computer screen. Participants
were told that they had to divide a certain number of coins, each
with a value of 1 Euro, between themselves and the anonymous
second players (i.e., the responders); the participants were told that
the game was played online through an Internet connection with
the responders. They were also told that the responder could accept
or reject the offer they made: if the responder rejected the offer,
both players would receive nothing; if the offer was accepted, the
coins would be distributed as suggested by the participant. Subse-
quently, they were informed about the existence of two kinds of
stakes: stakes with complete information and stakes with hidden
information. In case of the complete information, both players
were aware of the amount of coins in the game. In case of hidden
information, only the proposer knew the total amount of coins
that could be shared, and the responder was not aware that there
was hidden information.
The task consisted of 15 conditions with three levels for the
total number of coins (8, 9, or 10 coins in the game) and five levels
for the number of hidden coins (0, 2, 3, 4, or 5 hidden coins). Each
condition was offered twice in a random distribution yielding a
total number of 30 trials.
Each trial started with a fixation cross with duration of 1 s, fol-
lowed by the stimulus, which was response terminated. Hidden
information trials involved blue coins visible to both the proposer
and the responder, and white coins only visible to the proposer (see
Figure 1). When the stimulus appeared, the proposer could make
an offer from 0 to a maximum of 8, 9, or 10 coins (depending on
the condition) by pressing an associated key on the keyboard. After
the proposer made the offer, a screen appeared for 3 s, which sig-
naled that the receiver was making his/her decision. The decision
of the receiver was not presented to the proposer to avoid learning
effects. Following the decision-time screen, a feedback screen of
5 s was presented which summed up the offer and indicated what
the proposer would retain if the offer would be accepted.
THE INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX
In order to measure the cognitive component of empathy, partic-
ipants filled out the PT subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity
-Example
8
2
Total: 10
Indicate how many coins you want to give to the other 
player by typing a number between 1 and 10.
-Example
10
0
Total: 10
Indicate how many coins you want to give to the other 
player by typing a number between 1 and 10.
FIGURE 1 | Complete and incomplete information conditions visible to
the participant in the role of proposer. The blue coins indicate visibility to
both proposer and responder. The white coins indicate a hidden condition
and are only visible to the proposer.
Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). This self-report questionnaire has been
used extensively with children and adolescents before (Litvack-
Miller et al., 1997; Eisenberg et al., 1999; Gleason et al., 2009).
The PT subscale explicitly measures the cognitive tendency to see
things from the point of view of others, without necessarily expe-
riencing any affective response. The subscale consists of six items
to be answered on a five point Likert scale with (1) completely
untrue, (3) in between, and (5) completely true. Cronbach’s alpha
for the PT subscale was 0.71.
PROCEDURES
All participants were tested in a quiet laboratory or classroom.
They were told that they were going to play an online game with
anonymous same-age others from a different school or university.
In reality, the other person was not present and waiting time was
computer-simulated. It was explained that the computer would
randomly choose trials at the end of the experiment, which would
be paid to the participants as well as to the second players. It was
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thus emphasized that their final reward depended on their choices
during the game and the acceptance of the offers by the responder.
To make sure that the youngest participants also understood the
instructions, the experimenters read the instructions out loud and
used chocolate coins to explain the concept. They were explained
that there were no right or wrong answers and that they could rely
on their own judgment. After the instructions, the task was com-
pleted individually on a laptop computer. The task started with
eight practice trials, followed by 30 experimental trials. The task
was self-paced and all participants completed the game within
15 min. Following the task, the participants filled out the IRI
questionnaire (Davis, 1980).
The children were told beforehand that they could choose a
small present from the money they would earn in the game.
All of the presents the children could choose from had approxi-
mately the same value. Adults were told that they would receive the
money they had won during the game. All adults were paid a fixed
amount of 6.50 Euros (approximately 8 dollars). Neither children
nor adults indicated to have any doubts about the genuineness of
the task and/or the outcome of their payments.
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES IRI
In order to examine age differences in PT skills on the self-report
scale of the IRI, we first performed a univariate analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with PT as the dependent variable and age group
as a fixed factor. Results showed a main effect of age [F(4,
89)= 3.65, p< 0.01], which indicates that the age groups dif-
fered on their PT skills. Tukey post hoc tests demonstrated a
difference between the youngest and the oldest age group, where
20-year-olds scored significantly higher than the 8/9-year-olds
(M = 15.95, SD= 2.73 and M = 10.75, SD= 4.79, respectively).
The remaining age groups did not differ from each other (10-year-
olds: M = 14.06, SD= 6.47, 11-year-olds: M = 13.4, SD= 3.14,
12-year-olds: M = 12.47, SD= 3). The correlation between age
and PT skills was also significant (r = 0.29, p< 0.01).
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES HIDDEN UG
First, we tested whether the context of the 15 conditions resulted in
different offers. A 3 (total coins) × 5 (hidden coins) repeated mea-
sure ANOVA across participants indeed resulted in a main effect
of total number of coins [F(1, 88)= 103.29, p< 0.01], as well as
a main effect of the number of hidden coins [F(1, 88)= 425.72,
p< 0.01]; there was no significant interaction. First, as can be seen
in Figure 2, participants offered a higher amount of coins when
there were more coins to be divided. Second, participants gave
fewer coins when there was more hidden information. Thus, the
main effects validated that the task was successful in measuring
fairness considerations under hidden conditions.
The interaction between 3 (total coins) × 5 (hidden coins) × 5
(age group) was not significant. One reason for not finding age
effects in this general analysis could be the large number of condi-
tions, which undermined smaller age effects in strategic intentions.
The unequal trials (counting up to an uneven number of total
coins) were added for exploratory reasons, in order to see how
participants would act in reaction to trials in which the partici-
pants are forced to choose an unequal distribution. A limitation
of these trials is that it is not possible to distinguish between altru-
istic and strategic trials when the total number of trials is unequal
(in essence, on these trials). For this reason, we performed addi-
tional tests on the equally numbered trials and as can be seen in
the subsequent analyses, when we tested for specific comparisons
for fairness considerations, the expected age effects emerged. Next,
we present how these considerations are present in different age
groups.
AGE COMPARISONS
In our analyses examining age effects, we only included the offers
that contained an even number of coins (total 8 or total 10), and
an even number of hidden coins (0, 2, or 4). These trials were
selected because they allow for direct comparisons of one factor
while keeping other factors stable (e.g., 8/0 versus 8/2 tests for
the role of hidden information while keeping total number of
0
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2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
10/0 8/2 7/3 6/4 5/5 9/0 7/2 6/3 5/4 4/5 8/0 6/2 5/3 4/4 3/5
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FIGURE 2 | Mean offers and standard errors of offers made in the three
complete information conditions (10/0, 9/0, and 8/0) and the 12 hidden
information conditions with two (8/2, 7/2, and 6/2), three (7/3, 6/3, and
5/3), four (6/4, 5/4, and 4/4), and five hidden coins (5/5, 4/5, and 3/5).
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coins stable). Thus, the analyses below focus on specific questions
targeted in this experiment. See Table 2 for an overview of mean
offers per condition and age group.
The first question concerned whether there were age differences
in the no-hidden information condition. A repeated measure analy-
sis (ANOVA) with amount of coins (two levels: 10/0 versus 8/0) as
a within-subjects factor and age group (five levels) as a between-
subjects factor yielded the expected main effect of amount of coins
[F(1, 88)= 80.09, p< 0.001] and a marginally significant main
effect of age [F(4, 88)= 2.35, p= 0.06]. Post hoc Tukey compar-
isons on the age effect revealed that the 20-year-old group offered
significantly more than the 8- to 9-year-old group, with the other
groups showing intermediate scores.
The second question concerned whether the age groups were
differentially sensitive to hidden information when this increased
the total number of coins available. A repeated measure analysis
(ANOVA) with hidden coins (two levels: 8/2 versus 8/0) as a
within-subjects factor and age group (five levels) as a between-
subjects factor yielded a main effect of hidden coins [F(1,
88)= 12.13, p< 0.01] and a main effect of age [F(4, 88)= 2.99,
p< 0.05]. There was no hidden coin × age group interaction. The
main effect of hidden coins showed that all participants offered
more coins when more coins were available in the hidden informa-
tion condition (8/2) compared to the complete information condi-
tion (8/0; see Figure 3). The age effect was examined using Tukey’s
b post hoc tests and the results showed that 8/9-year-olds kept sig-
nificantly more coins for themselves by making lower offers in both
conditions than the 10-year-olds and the 20-year-olds. Ten and
11-year-olds did not differ significantly from the other age groups.
Table 2 | Descriptives of mean offers of the 15 conditions in five age
groups.
Mean age
9Years 10Years 11Years 12Years 20Years
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
TOTAL OF 10 COINS
10/0 4.17 (1.71) 4.47 (1.05) 4.70 (0.75) 4.50 (1.1) 4.88 (0.61)
8/2 3.38 (1.46) 4.08 (1.23) 4.04 (1.03) 4.12 (0.93) 4.33 (0.48)
7/3 3.83 (1.27) 3.83 (1.06) 3.70 (0.84) 4.15 (1.06) 4.10 (0.54)
6/4 3.25 (1.12) 3.83 (1) 3.70 (0.84) 3.56 (1.09) 3.64 (0.73)
5/5 3.33 (1.8) 3.86 (1.26) 3.36 (0.9) 3.32 (1.26) 3.43 (0.75)
TOTAL OF 9 COINS
9/0 3.79 (2.15) 4.28 (1.27) 3.88 (0.99) 4.12 (0.96) 4.38 (0.59)
7/2 3.29 (1.42) 3.75 (1.44) 3.68 (1.04) 4.03 (0.86) 3.88 (0.31)
6/3 3.25 (1.79) 3.53 (1.27) 3.22 (0.82) 3.71 (1.03) 3.38 (0.5)
5/4 3.54 (1.5) 3.61 (1.36) 3.32 (0.78) 3.03 (1.14) 3.14 (0.48)
4/5 2.79 (1.66) 3.14 (1.29) 2.94 (1) 2.97 (1.15) 2.71 (0.9)
TOTAL OF 8 COINS
8/0 3.08 (1.08) 3.81 (0.88) 3.60 (0.79) 3.65 (0.77) 4.10 (0.54)
6/2 3.21 (1.36) 3.31 (0.96) 3.22 (0.75) 3.50 (0.9) 3.38 (0.5)
5/3 2.71 (0.94) 3.33 (1.28) 2.94 (0.75) 3.24 (1.05) 3.00 (0.55)
4/4 2.71 (1.34) 2.94 (1.38) 2.84 (0.66) 2.68 (1.2) 2.60 (0.74)
3/5 2.50 (1.9) 2.86 (0.97) 2.54 (0.95) 2.59 (1.18) 2.52 (0.75)
Third, in order to examine age differences in strategic
motivations, we compared conditions with varying amounts of
hidden coins, when this decreased the total number of coins avail-
able. A repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with hidden coins
(three levels: 8/0 versus 6/2 versus 4/4) as a within-subjects fac-
tor and age group (five levels) as a between-subjects factor again
yielded a main effect of hidden number of coins [F(1, 88)= 55.32,
p< 0.01] and a marginally significant interaction between hid-
den coins and age group [F(4, 88)= 2.27, p< 0.07; pη2n= 0.1, see
Figure 4].
To examine whether offers in complete information conditions
were significantly different from offers made in the hidden con-
ditions within age groups, a repeated measure (ANOVA) post hoc
analysis was conducted between the conditions 8/0, 6/2, and 4/4
for each age group separately. The results demonstrated that all
age groups differentiate between the three conditions [all Fs (1,
16–24)> 9.91, all ps< 0.01], except for the youngest age group
(8/9-year-olds).
The same analysis was performed for the 10 coins condition.
Here, the repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with hidden coins
(three levels: 10/0 versus 8/2 versus 6/4) as a within-subjects fac-
tor and age group (five levels) as a between-subjects factor again
yielded a main effect of hidden number of coins [F(1, 88)= 53.16,
p< 0.001]. Contrary to what we expected, neither a main effect for
age (p= 0.17) nor an interaction between hidden coins and age
group (p= 0.66) was significant. Thus, the age differences were
restricted to specific conditions, which could indicate that the 8-
to 9-year-old group has more variance in responding yielding only
some of the age effects significant. In order to determine whether
this was the case, we have performed an independent t -test to
measure the homogeneity between the different age groups for
each condition separately. Levene’s test for equality of error vari-
ances showed that there was no significant variance between age
groups in case of the conditions: 8/0, 8/2, and 6/4. The remain-
ing conditions did show unequal variance between age groups,
such that variance was larger in the youngest groups compared
to the older age groups: 10/0 (p< 0.01), 6/2 (p< 0.05), and 4/4
(p< 0.01).
Next, we were still interested in testing whether there would
be a difference when selecting only the youngest and the oldest
age group, based on visual inspection of the graphs. A repeated
measure analysis (ANOVA) with hidden coins (three levels: 10/0
versus 8/2 versus 6/4) as a within-subjects factor and age (two lev-
els: 8/9-year-olds versus 20-year-olds) as a between-subjects factor
yielded the expected main effect of condition [F(1, 31)= 32.11,
p< 0.01] and the expected main effect of age [F(1, 31)= 5.23,
p< 0.05]. This result is consistent with previous findings report-
ing lower offers by 8/9-year-olds compared to adults. We note
though that this is a post hoc analysis and should be interpreted
with caution.
LINKS WITH PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
To examine whether PT changes over time related to the offers
made in the UG, correlations were computed between UG con-
ditions and the PT scale of the IRI. The scale did not correlate
with coins offered in the complete information conditions (8/0).
In contrast, the PT scale was positively related to the number of
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FIGURE 3 | Mean amount of proposed coins and standard errors in the complete 8/0 condition versus the hidden 8/2 condition in all age groups.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean amount of coins and standard errors offered in the 3 conditions with a total number of 8 coins (i.e., 8/0, 6/2, and 4/4) in five age
groups.
coins offered in the hidden information condition 8/2 (r = 0.21,
p< 0.05) and related marginally to the hidden information con-
dition 6/4 (r = 0.19, p= 0.06), and 4/4 (r = 0.19, p= 0.06). This
scale identifies the participants who are able to adopt the perspec-
tive of others in real life situations (Davis, 1980). Thus, this asso-
ciation seems to indicate that the hidden information condition
required PT.
After controlling for age, PT was positively related to the num-
ber of coins offered in all hidden conditions, except for the 8/2
(r = 0.23, p< 0.05, N = 87) condition: 6/2 (r = 0.21, p< 0.05,
N = 87), 6/4 (r = 0.24, p< 0.05, N = 87), and 4/4 (r = 0.28,
p< 0.01, N = 87). There were no significant correlations with the
complete information conditions (8/0 or 10/0).
In addition, we also performed a mediation analysis in order
to be able to determine whether PT has a mediating role in the
age differences in UG behavior. In the first regression model,
age was found to be significantly and positively associated with
PT (b1= 0.32, p< 0.01). In regression model two, the associa-
tion between PT and amount of coins offered in the 8/2 con-
dition was found to be significantly and positively associated
(b2= 0.23, p< 0.05). The third regression model found that age
and amount of offered coins in the 8/2 condition were significant
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and positively associated (b3= 0.21, p< 0.05). Finally, when age
and PT were included in the same model, the association between
age and amount of coins offered in the 8/2 condition was no
longer significant (b4= 0.3, p< 0.08), fulfilling the requirements
for full mediation. The Sobel Test confirmed that PT fully medi-
ated the association between age and amount of coins offered
(p< 0.01). Thus, older participants who scored higher on the
self-report PT subscale made higher offers in the specific case of
the 8/2 condition. No mediation effects were found for the other
conditions.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine the role of strategic versus
altruistic motivations in fairness considerations and their develop-
mental trajectories. The results of this study show that by age 8/9
children already show strategic fairness considerations. All partici-
pants reduced the number of coins offered when information was
hidden, showing that the ability to use strategies already devel-
ops at a young age. Specific follow up comparisons revealed age
differences in how children and adults used strategies. That is, in
standard proposal situations (i.e., with no-hidden information),
adults proposed more fair offers than 8/9-year-old children, with
children between ages 10 and 12 showing an intermediate pattern.
The results further show that by age 8/9 children distinguish less
between the hidden and no-hidden information conditions com-
pared to adults who clearly differentiated based on the impending
information. It should be noted that it was only in a subset of
the conditions that children in the age of 8/9 years-old acted less
strategically than adults. Yet, these results may indicate that adults
are in certain situations more strategic than children. Below, we
interpret these results in the light of our hypotheses.
The first hypothesis that was tested was whether adults show
higher levels of concern for others and have altruistic motives
for offering fair distributions. The results from the current study
suggest the development of more strategic motives during late
childhood, given that proposed offers in the complete informa-
tion conditions increased with age. The average amount of coins
adults proposed to the other party in complete information con-
ditions was approximately 50% compared to an average of 40%
of the youngest age group. This age-related increase in offers
made in complete information conditions is consistent with prior
results (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Gürogˇlu et al., 2009; Steinbeis et al.,
2012). Consistent with this point of view, Epley et al. (2004) per-
formed an experiment in which participants had to take the visual
perspective of the other person, to see objects from their point
of view. The results showed that adults compared to children
viewed solutions from different perspectives and were better in
controlling their self-centered tendency in taking perspective of
others. In this study, strategic motivations can possibly explain
the increased prosocial behavior in adults, where they make fair
offers to maximize their own outcomes (Reuben and van Winden,
2010). People tend to offer higher amounts when they reason
about what other people will find acceptable and what is accepted
according to social norms (Straub and Murnighan, 1995). The
fear of being rejected by their counterpart prevents proposers to
make a low offer (van Dijk and Vermunt, 2000; van Dijk et al.,
2004).
The hypothesis of increases in strategic fairness considerations
finds support in the analyses of the hidden conditions. The hidden,
or incomplete information, conditions allowed for the comparison
of offers where information was not available to the responder. All
participants were strategic and offered less in the hidden, con-
ditions compared to when all information was available to the
responder. At the same time, all participants were also altruistic,
because they did not lower their offer to 50% of what was visible
to the responder (for example, even in the 4/4 condition, partic-
ipants offered on average 2.8 coins, which is more than 2 coins
which would have been considered a fair split by the responder).
A comparison of age groups revealed lower offers by children and
adults in case of the hidden 8/2, 6/2, and 4/4 conditions. Adults
offered approximately 45% of their amount in the 8/2 condition,
and children offered approximately 40%. In case of the 6/2, and
4/4 conditions, however, the offers of children and adults were
no longer different from each other. These findings indicate that
children already have a basic understanding of different strategic
motives, but that behavior of adults is more consistent and seems
to be more driven by strategic intentions.
Previous studies already pointed out that adult proposers like
to benefit from a favorable situation (Kagel et al., 1995; van Dijk
et al., 2004; Koning et al., 2011). The current findings show
that children showed a small decrease in number of coins pro-
posed to the other player under hidden conditions, whereas adults
dropped their offers to a much less altruistic, self-interested level
compared to the complete information condition. Possibly, this
reflects more self-oriented decision-making in case of more hid-
den information in the older age groups. One interpretation of this
developmental difference is that the age-related increase in levels
of PT, which allows individuals to predict what others find fair or
unfair. This hypothesis is supported by our findings that behav-
ior in the hidden conditions was correlated with self-reported PT
skills and the outcomes of the mediation analyses revealing that
self-reported PT mediates the relation between age and strategic
UG behavior.
A second possible mechanism which can explain the devel-
opmental difference is the increase in inhibitory control with
increasing age. An intriguing study by Steinbeis et al. (2012)
revealed a correlation between strategic UG behavior (indexed
by the difference score of the UG and the DG) and perfor-
mance on the stop-signal task, a measure for response inhibition.
These differences were associated with developmental changes in
the contribution of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
a brain region known to develop across childhood and adoles-
cence. Thus, it is possible that besides PT, the ability to control
impulsive choices also contributes to the development of strate-
gic bargaining. For example, Steinbeis et al. (2012) described that
young children (age 6–9) can already point out when a division is
unfair. Yet it is only with increasing age that they act strategically
accordingly.
Taken together, this study showed that between ages 8 and
13, children offer more to others in the UG, but also become
more strategic in fairness consideration. These findings were inter-
preted in terms of increasing levels of PT and impulse control. One
aspect which received less attention in this study was the role of
individual differences. Takagishi et al. (2010) recently reported
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that half of the children younger than six already reject unequal
offers. Thus, there are important individual differences in fair-
ness considerations among children, which can have influenced
the robustness of the findings in this study, especially in the
younger children. Future studies would therefore greatly bene-
fit from following children’s fairness behavior longitudinally, and
relate this development to individual differences in personality,
empathy, and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 2005).
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